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 “The god called Nothingness”: Büchner, Shakespeare and Original Sin 
[5,694 words] 
Sin quite literally haunts the protagonists of Büchner’s Danton’s Death, as in a more 
metaphoric sense it haunts the play itself. Gazing from his window at a sleeping Paris, 
Danton asks: “Will it never stop? Will the light never die, the noise never stop? Will it 
never be dark and silent so we can stop hearing our foul sins? September!”1 The 
reference is to Danton’s responsibility for the September massacres in Paris of 1791. 
Even Robespierre is surprised by sin: “Something inside me. A bloody finger, 
pointing. I wind rags around it but the blood seeps through” (p.30). Sin is also present 
in the comic subplot. Simon the prompter abuses his wife – “You apple rotten with 
sin” (p.13) – for prostituting their daughter in order to keep them from starvation.  
Two of these passages resonate with Shakespeare. Robespierre’s haunting 
broadly echoes the bloodstained hands motif in Macbeth.2 Simon’s abuse of his wife 
echoes Hamlet’s abuse of Ophelia in the nunnery scene: “Why wouldst thou be a 
breeder of sinners?”3 Because neither passage can be directly sourced to Shakespeare, 
a claim of “resonance” may seem thin. Yet so saturated is Büchner’s play with 
Shakespeare (in the Schlegel/Tieck translation), that the point is less to identify direct 
citations or claim individual points of resonance than to pose the question of the value 
that Shakespeare held for Büchner. This at least is the conclusion reached by Jean-
Louis Besson in the Shakespeare section of his book-length study of the sources for 
Danton’s Death.4 Whether “you apple rotten with sin” originates in the nunnery scene 
of Hamlet or whether it doesn’t, is pointless to ask in view of the obvious echo of 
Hamlet shortly afterwards, when Simon – himself a clone of ancient Pistol – 
apologizes to his wife: 
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Ah, can you forgive me Portia? Did I hit you? 
That wasn’t me. I was mad. 
His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy. 
Then Hamlet does it not; Hamlet denies it. 
Where is our daughter? (p.17) 
Not only is Hamlet directly referenced here but also Julius Caesar and Henry V. 
My aim here is to pose the question of the aesthetic, intellectual or even 
spiritual work performed by Shakespeare in Danton’s Death. Büchner’s deep 
admiration for Shakespeare is part of the answer of course. The search for a 
dramaturgical model for the Terror of 1792, somewhere between the Shakespearean 
history play and Shakespearean tragedy is another part of it. (Terry Eagleton has 
already noted the weight of Büchner’s stress on Aristotelian hamartia).5 But the core 
of the relationship – I will suggest – is the idea of sin: primal sin, original sinfulness. 
Behind or alongside of Büchner’s obsession with Shakespeare is an urge to rediscover 
what I have elsewhere described as the driving force of the early modern English 
revenge play: the convergence of the Aristotelian with the Pauline senses of the word 
hamartia.6 Tragic flaw, original sin: these are two concepts for the same tendency of 
human timber towards crookedness, warping, radical evil or entanglement in vice, 
failure, futility, crime. The effect of combining them in a tragic-historical structure is 
not just to underline the Aristotelian notion of the flaw, but to redescribe that concept 
– to critically historicize it – in the sense of submitting it to a theological gaze that the 
Enlightenment had recently thought to have escaped. “We were botched when we 
were created, we lack something, some element”, muses Danton,  “I cant name it, but 
we won’t find it by pulling each other’s guts out and scrabbling around in each other’s 
entrails” (p.34). The rhetoric may not be Pauline, but the thought itself clearly is. 
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 The previous question provokes others. How much of the original sin theme in 
Danton’s Death is due to Büchner, and how much to Shakespeare and/or the 
traditional topoi upon which Büchner drew and was able to inform himself through 
Shakespeare? Must Büchner now be thought of as over-written by a regressive 
doctrine in the guise of a literary enthusiasm; or can we see him engaging the doctrine 
to elucidate an authentic intuition arising from what Kierkegaard – in his brief essay 
on Hamlet – calls “existence-categories”?7 This poses a broader issue regarding the 
activity of sources and influences between host and tributary texts. In which 
directions do the intellectual currents run or eddy? How far does the cited passage 
colonize the mental impulse prompting the citation; how far into the intuition of the 
citing author does the cited passage reach? In general terms there can be no single 
answer to this question. What we tend to find is a spectrum from passive reception of 
the citation to imaginatively or conceptually transformative uses (the high-water mark 
of which would be represented by Shakespeare’s metamorphosis of his own sources). 
At one end of the spectrum, we find the citation shaping its host text: the relation here 
would be tuitional or doctrinal. At the other end, the host text absorbs the citation and 
transforms it: the relation here would be intuitive and dialectical. In the case of a 
formal doctrine, one would seem to be stuck at the passive end of this spectrum. By 
definition a doctrine is a teaching, a regimentation, a tuition. Original sin moreover is 
notoriously directive and intolerant even by the standard of other doctrines. It is not a 
proposition with which one “begs to differ”. One either swallows it wholesale like 
Baudelaire as a confessed disciple of Joseph de Maistre (the reactionary apostle of the 
“counter-enlightenment”); or one repudiates it like Voltaire in the mid eighteenth 
century as the pre-eminent stumbling block to progress.8 By the measure of Voltaire, 
Büchner could be said to entertain the doctrine – much like Shakespeare in Hamlet – 
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rather too enthusiastically. In both cases, the intuitive motive appears to invite the 
tuitional element and cede too much to it. In Büchner’s specific case, we must ask: 
does this active revolutionary compromise his radically progressive principles by 
engaging with a doctrine which (after de Maistre) is virtually married to reactionary 
politics?9 
That is a real possibility. There is however another. In the first of the Bampton 
lectures of 1924, Norman P. Williams notes how unintuitive the doctrine of original 
sin had seemed a mere decade earlier on the eve of the First World War, when men 
consoled themselves “for the impossibility of accounting for the origin of evil by the 
assurance of its necessary and speedy extinction, as the result of an irresistible upward 
trend of moral evolution”.10 But, he goes on to add, “the events through which 
humanity has lived since then have for ever dispelled such credulous optimism” (p.4). 
Notwithstanding his professed Christianity and respectfulness of traditional doctrine, 
Williams insists that the motive to belief in original sin is always existential before it 
is doctrinal. For the legatees of the Great War such belief is therefore an intuition first 
and a tuition second. This is to say that the intuition seeks out the doctrinal and 
mythical ground rather than arising from it. Not only indeed was this the case of 
Williams and the survivors of the Great War to whom he refers, but such it was in the 
formation of the doctrine at the earliest biblical stages in the Old Testament. Williams 
argues that the Fall-doctrine in the Old Testament “originated in the thought of post-
exilic Judaism and the result of reflection on the empirical universality of Actual Sin” 
(xi). The context and motive of this thought, then, was a national catastrophe. The 
story of Adam and Eve in Genesis is no more than a locus classicus, as suggested by 
the fact that the biblical locus had originally been Genesis vi, which tells of “the sons 
of the gods” breeding with the “daughters of men” (pp.23-29). Thus: 
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Whatever we may think of this regressive chain of reasoning, from the facts of 
the moral struggle back to the idea of an inherited taint and from that again to 
the conception of a primordial sin, it is clear that, inasmuch as the first Fall-
story was that of Gen.vi, the doctrines of the Fall and of Original Sin cannot be 
regarded as standing or falling with the historicity of Gen.iii. (p.32) 
The true foundations of the Fall and Original Sin are then, “psychological, based on 
bed-rock facts of ethical and spiritual experience” (p.31). We do not need to be 
positively certain of William’s case to see its suggestiveness for Danton’s Death. 
To be sure Büchner discovers a clearly Pauline version of this doctrine in 
Shakespeare, and it is deeply there to be discovered. More importantly he discovers 
the doctrine because he has a deep existential stake in finding it. Writing in the wake 
of the German Enlightenment and in despair at the failure of the French Revolution, 
Büchner seeks to unearth a hoary theological complex that had been definitively 
interred by Volairean and Schillerian humanism alike. Turning from Schiller therefore 
(whose relative absence from Danton’s Death is noteworthy), Büchner avails himself 
not just of Shakespeare and contemporary dramatists (such as Tourneur11) but the 
hoarier commonplace of the theatrum mundi that had served as a vehicle of an 
hamartia-laden view of radical human incapacity since antiquity. This in turn 
reinforces the pertinence of our approach via resonance or intertextuality rather than 
direct citation.12 The theatrum mundi is at once independent of Shakespeare, and itself 
a vector of pessimism from Shakespeare through to Lenz, the Sturm und Drang poet 
who is himself the subject of Büchner’s monologue, Lenz.13 Büchner’s reading of 
Shakespeare is thus a thinking with Shakespeare about a mutual problem (sin), in 
terms of a mutually available formula, the theatrum mundi.  
 6
In this latter connection, I will suggest that Danton’s Death (already known to 
resonate powerfully with Hamlet) resonates far more extensively than is thought with 
Measure for Measure, specifically – and profoundly – with what is perhaps the most 
elusive and philosophically dense engagement with the theatrum mundi in 
Shakespeare: the crux represented by Isabella’s “glassy essence” conceit: 
…but man, proud man, 
Dressed in a little brief authority, 
Most ignorant of what he’s most assured, 
His glassy essence, like an angry ape 
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven 
As makes the angels weep; who, with our spleens, 
Would all themselves laugh mortal. (2.2.120-26) 
While the primary metaphor here is that of a glass rather than a theatre, the two 
metaphors are closely related in Shakespeare as in early modernity generally 
(Marlowe asks us to view Tamburlaine’s fortunes “in this tragic glass”) and – we 
shall see – in Büchner.14 Was Büchner specifically responding to the “glassy essence” 
passage? It is quite possible in as much that – in Besson’s view at least – the play is 
cited elsewhere in Dantons’ Death.15 What interests me is the logic – the philosophy – 
of Büchner’s take on the theatrum mundi commonplace as compared with 
Shakespeare’s. To put this differently, I am interested in the remarkably powerful 
intertextual resonance between Büchner and Shakespeare: a resonance bespeaking 
both continuity and discontinuity, a chasm on the one hand and a bridge on the other.  
We can begin with the point in Büchner to resonate most strongly with the 
“glassy essence” conceit of Measure for Measure. The context is scene six of the first 
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act: the interview between Danton and Robespierre. The two men are not quite alone. 
Present also is Félix Paris, a clerk of the Revolutionary Tribunal who – both in history 
and in Büchner – went by the name of Rousseau’s republican archetype from the 
Premier Discours: “Fabricius”. The name bespeaks the primary topic at issue between 
the two men: virtue. Danton is concerned to deflect Robespierre from the Terror. 
Robespierre’s answer is that the revolution is only half complete. The moral task is 
yet to do: “Vice must be punished, virtue must rule through terror”. Danton is 
skeptical not merely of the Terror but of virtue itself: Robespierre is “abominably 
virtuous”, his “self-righteous expression” a mask stuck to his face while “running 
about between heaven and earth, only for the miserable pleasure of finding people 
worse off” (p.28). In addition to the theatrical metaphor, there is surely an echo of 
Hamlet’s “crawling between heaven and earth” (Hamlet, 3.1.125). Büchner’s 
“zwichen Himmel und Erde herumzulaufen”, echoes the rendition of Hamlet’s phrase 
in the translation of Schlegel and Tieck: “zwischen Himmel und Erde 
herumkriechen”.16 That this echo goes un-noted either by Besson or by Jacobs (who 
each make a point of noting Shakespearean echoes) suggests something of the sheer 
fertility of Shakespeare within Büchner.  
The indexing of Hamlet at just this juncture of the argument is highly 
significant. The scene from which the phrase is taken – the “nunnery scene” (3.1) – is 
that with the highest concentration of references to original sin: “virtue”, Hamlet 
insists, “cannot so inoculate our old stock but we shall relish of it” (3.1.120-21).17 
Ophelia must get herself to a nunnery so as not to be “a breeder of sinners”. Hamlet 
owns himself, “indifferent honest, but yet I could accuse me of such things, that it 
were better my mother had not borne me” (3.1.124-26). Hence he pictures himself 
“crawling” between earth and heaven, an image remarkably suggestive of Joseph de 
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Maistre’s patristically derived imagery of serpentine groveling.18 Hence, to 
Rousseau’s upright Fabricius (a role that Robespierre takes himself virtually to 
incarnate) Danton opposes Shakespeare’s Hamlet: not the sweet prince but the 
crawling wretch.  
In this regard too, it is significant that Büchner should twice echo Hamlet’s 
most libertine pose: sitting with his head in Ophelia’s lap and speaking bawdy just 
prior to the play-within-the-play. Büchner’s play opens with Danton “sitting on a 
stool at Julie’s feet” (p.9) and passing mordantly obscene witticisms. The same pose 
is inverted in Act one scene five, when Danton’s mistress, Marion, sits at his feet to 
relate the history of her plunge into sensuality. In the badinage that follows, Lacroix 
opines that “Young girls should not be allowed to sit in the sun or the gnats will be 
doing it in the palms of their hands, giving them ideas” (p.24). There is an echo of 
Hamlet’s advice to Polonius in respect of his daughter: “Let her not walk i’th’sun. 
Conception is a blessing, but as your daughter may conceive – Friend, look to’t” 
(2.2.186-87). Again there seems an echo of Lear’s “the small gilded fly / Does lecher 
in my sight” (The History of King Lear, 4.5.109-10). 
To Danton’s taunting, Robespierre replies, “My conscience is clear”; to which 
Danton answers: “Conscience is an ape tormenting himself before a mirror” (p.28). 
The resonance with Isabella’s lines in Measure for Measure (2.2.120-26) – quoted 
above – is nigh irresistible. The situations are similar: in both plays a self-righteous 
judge is criticized for hypocrisy. If at first glance however Büchner appears to have 
bypassed the “glassy essence” conceit, he delivers a compelling gloss on 
Shakespeare’s “angry ape”: the ape’s reflection in the mirror torments him because it 
“apes” his every gesture. The thought is picked up very precisely in Robespierre’s 
subsequent monologue (after the exit of Danton and Fabricius). In a clear reference to 
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the historical Robespierre’s claim that false revolutionaries were to detected by their 
aping of revolutionary terminology19, Büchner’s Robespierre is outraged that Danton 
should have abused him in his own phrase: “Kick my high heels? Use my 
terminology? Mine?” (p.29). It is at this point, that he slides into his own existential 
mise en abyme of “aping” and/or mirroring: 
My thoughts watch each other…. 
No virtue? Virtue the heel of my shoe? My terminology? 
Thought against thought, why can’t I stop? (pp.29-30) 
Robespierre’s conscience is almost literally an ape tormenting itself before a mirror. 
The idea of thoughts as compulsive mirror-opposites suggests that the mind has no 
essential consistency beyond its “glassiness”. Any claim to an essence which is not 
itself mimetic is thus a lie. The mind is a glass, in which the man-ape torments itself 
with its abortive theogonies20, the ferment of its becomings and unbecomings: 
There. There. Inside me, telling lies to all the rest of me. 
He goes to the window. 
Night snores over the earth and shifts in a desolate dream. 
Insubstantial thoughts, desires only dimly suspected, 
confused, formless, take shape and steal into the silent house 
of dreams. They open the doors, stare out of the windows, 
they become half-flesh, the limbs stretch, the lips move. And 
when we wake, we may be brighter, more precise, more 
concrete by daylight, but are we not still in a dream? Oh what 
the mind does, who can blame us? The mind goes through 
more actions in one hour than the lumbering body does in a 
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lifetime. A thought may be a sin, but whether or not that 
thought becomes a deed, whether the body acts upon it, is 
chance. 
St.Just comes on. 
Who’s that in the dark? Light! Light! (p.30) 
Robespierre’s position “at the window” anticipates that of Danton mentally “hearing” 
the “foul sins” of the September massacre (p.43). His panicked call for “light” echoes 
the stricken words with which Claudius interrupts the play-within-the-play: “Give me 
some light. Away” (Hamlet, 3.2.257). The echo seems to guess at how Shakespeare’s 
Claudius – the uncanny double who is eventually described by Hamlet as “this canker 
of our nature”(5.2.70, my italics) – emblematizes original sin as a repetition of Cain, 
the first murderer.21 Robespierre’s unguarded meditation on thought suggests that 
man will never rise to the consistency of virtue – never approach God – because the 
mind will never escape the dreary circus of imitation. Thought will never be known to 
itself. Thinking is nothing but its own mirror, consciousness cloudily reflected back as 
unconscious. Wittingly or not, the passage reproduces traditional theological doctrine 
in respect of the teeming multiplicity of mental sinfulness: a moment’s thought is 
embryo to a life-time of sinning. In potentia, so to speak, we are already, “the 
merciless MacDonwald, worthy to be a rebel for to that / the multiplying villainies of 
nature / Do swarm upon him” (Macbeth, 1.2.9-12). The mere chance that we may not 
act on what we already imagine is the only thing stopping us from becoming 
monsters. In a more existential vein, the passage also rehearses the twist given to the 
theatrum mundi formula in Calderon’s Life is a Dream: if the world is a stage, then 
what is the more “real”, waking or dreaming? 
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 The dialogue between Danton and Robespierre in Danton’s Death makes such 
strong sense of the figure of Isabella’s “angry ape” that we are tempted to regard it as 
a close reading. Whether this is entirely so or not however, we must now ask whether 
Büchner’s rereading – if that is what it is – exhausts Shakespeare’s thought. Clearly, it 
does not (or would not). We have already noted the apparent absence of the “glassy 
essence” conceit from Büchner’s text. This absence is only “apparent” for the reason 
that the “angry ape” figure substantially recapitulates it. There is however a scholastic 
dimension of meaning in “glassy essence” conceit that is not picked up by the “angry 
ape” component, and that is indeed absent from Büchner.22 J.V. Cunningham sees in 
Isabella’s conceit: “the scholastic notion in a scholastic context: man’s essence is his 
intellectual soul, which is an image of God, and hence is glassy for it mirrors God”.23 
Yet, why should man be “ignorant” of his own intellectual soul? Cunningham cites an 
early modern answer from Ralegh’s History of the World: 
But man, to cover his own ignorance in the least things….that is ignorant of the 
essence of his own soul, and which the wisest of the naturalists (if Aristotle be 
he) could never so much as define, but by the action and effect, telling us what 
it works, (which all men know as well as he,) but not what it is, which neither 
he nor anyone else doth know, but God that created it, (For though I were 
perfect, yet I know not my soul, saith Job:) man, I say, that is but an idiot in the 
next cause of his own life, and in the cause of all the actions of his life, will, 
notwithstanding, examine the art of God in creating the world…24 
Man is then ignorant of the nature of his soul or his mind by nature so to speak. 
Ralegh’s non-Scholastic or purely Aristotelian perspective is much that of 
Shakespeare’s Achilles: 
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… Nor doth the eye itself, 
That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself, 
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed 
Salutes each other with each other’s form. 
For speculation turns not to itself 
Till it hath travelled and is mirrored there 
Where it may see itself. This is not strange at all.  
(Troilus and Cressida, 3.3.100-06) 
These two “naturalistic” accounts of man’s ignorance of his own mind do not occur to 
Isabella, for whom (unlike for Achilles) man is “most ignorant of what he’s most 
assured” (my italics). 
The immediate context in Measure for Measure partly explains how this 
works: the proud magistrate – “dressed in a little brief authority” – takes his essence 
as equivalent to his judicial function. He forgets that his spiritual identity is 
constituted by his mirroring of God rather than by his own self-assertion. To say that 
his identity is self-founded however, is to concede that it is mimetic because the 
costume of the judge is derived from the theatre of world. As “angry ape”, the judge 
plays “fantastic tricks” in an effort of competitive self-justification. His tricks 
however are viewed by a different audience than the earthly one they are designed for. 
This audience sits in “high heaven”. It consists of God, the angels and those few wise 
men who in any given age have understood the true or divine constitution of their 
identities and lived up to it. It is the classic statement of the theatrum mundi formula 
as given by John of Salisbury in the Policraticus, source of the presumptive motto 
(Totus Mundus Agit Historionem) of Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre.25 As I have argued 
elsewhere, there is a tension between the senses in which the presumptive motto of 
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the Globe works and the way in which the formula works in John of Salisbury.26 
Where the motto works at a horizontal or geographical level (the world is like a vast 
stage), the formula in the Policraticus works primarily at a vertical level: the world is 
a stage play ultimately for the benefit of a divine audience seated above in the 
spheres. This, as R.S. White has ably shown, is overwhelmingly the sense in which 
John Calvin took the formula.27 In unabashedly religious invocations of the metaphor, 
the divine audience finds the spectacle risible. The gods, angels and saints split their 
sides laughing at the antics of these wind-up human marionettes. Isabella’s version of 
the topos is more gentle: the angels “weep” to see the “fantastic tricks” of men. They 
would laugh only if possessed of “our spleens”. But that would quickly make them 
mortal. 
Having now glanced at the “scholastic” logic of Isabella’s conceit, and at the 
medieval background of the theatrum mundi, we must now attend to its New 
Testament context. This – like the theatrum mundi metaphor – is registered in 
Büchner’s re-reading, as the scholastic context is not. In Measure for Measure, 
Isabella’s “glassy essence” image is the centerpiece of a longer passage of some 
seventy lines (2.2.74-145) in which she reminds Angelo of his fallenness. Against 
Angelo’s insistence on the law, Isabella urges grace: 
ANGELO: Your brother is a forfeit of the law, 
And you but waste your words. 
ISABELLA: Alas, alas! 
Why all the souls that were, were forfeit once, 
And he that might the vantage best have took 
Found out the remedy. (2.2.73-77) 
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Human fallibility, Isabella reminds Angelo, would predict that many others besides 
Claudio must have offended against chastity without incurring such a harsh penalty. 
This brings the counter-argument: 
The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept. 
…                                            Now ‘tis awake, 
Takes note of what is done, and like a prophet 
Looks in a glass that shows what future evils… 
Are now to have no successive degrees (2.2.92-100) 
It is indeed Angelo’s assurance of being able – like a prophet with a telescope – to 
look into the future, that provokes the conceit of the “glassy essence”. Isabella reads 
Angelo’s prophetic pretensions as blasphemous: “Great men may jest with saints: ‘tis 
wit in them, / But in the less foul profanation” (2.2.130-31). Worse, the pose – the 
assurance – blinds Angelo to the weightier Pauline symbolism of the word “glass”. 
After the Fall, man beholds his divine image “darkly” at best: 
For now we see through a glasse darkly: but then shall we see face to face. Now 
I know in part: but then shall I know even as I am knowen.28 
It is because we see but darkly in a fallen world that faith, hope and love – chiefly 
love – are so much more important than wisdom or, “the gift of prophecie….all 
secrets and all knowledge” (1 Corinthians, 13:2). Angelo’s blindness to this is both 
the mark of his sinfulness and the reason he rejects Isabella’s advice: 
…                                          Go to your bosom, 
Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know 
That’s like my brother’s fault. If it confess 
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A natural guiltiness such as is his, 
Let it not sound a thought upon your tongue 
Against my brother’s life. (2.2.140-45) 
Measure for Measure as a whole invites a reading in terms of the idea of fallenness. 
The entire world of the play, all the characters (including Isabella) are flawed to the 
root. The only redemption the play offers is through forgiveness issuing from an 
acknowledgement of one’s own necessary failure. 
 We have urged a vigorous continuity between the thought world of Measure 
for Measure and that of Danton’s Death. But we have equally conceded the presence 
of a large historical and discursive gap. To return to the idea of original sin from 
within an overwhelmingly secular and post-revolutionary thought world is not to 
rehearse the traditional chapter and verse of St. Paul. We should not expect Büchner 
(like Kant in Goethe’s saying) to have “slobbered” on his philosopher’s cloak to quite 
this degree.29 For much the same reason, it is hardly strange that Büchner should not 
have picked up the full scholastic logic of the “glassy essence” conceit. The whole 
notion of the mind as a mirror of God – in principle if not in practice – is simply 
implausible in the context of Danton’s Death. What remains all too plausible however 
is that, as Danton puts it, “we were botched when we were created, we lack 
something, some element” (p.34). It now remains for us to elaborate the contexts 
which make this thought so inescapable to Danton and so intuitive to Büchner. 
 The chief context offered by Danton’s Death is that of the theatrum mundi. 
This in turn faces in two directions, towards the traditional roots of this figure and 
towards the totalization of theatre (or its idea) in revolutionary France. If Büchner is 
interested in the traditional meaning of the theatrum mundi, it is primarily as a 
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critique of the theatricalized logic of the Revolution. As Robespierre explains it to 
Danton, the Terror is necessary because the private sphere has evaporated into the 
public sphere. The Republican person is onstage whether he or she likes it or not; 
private morality is a matter of vital public interest. Vice is a palpable brand: “the 
aristocracy’s mark of Cain” (p.20). Hence, “the libertine is the enemy of the state” 
because vice in a Republic “is more than a moral, it is a political crime” (p.20). 
Loyalty to the Republic, therefore, must be active and public. The historical Saint-Just 
harangued the Convention: “you must punish not only the traitors but even the 
indifferent; you must punish whoever is passive in the Republic”.30 Hence too the 
importance of the ancient Roman Republican heroes Junius Brutus and Virginius, in 
Danton’s Death and in the Revolution alike. Like plays about William Tell, plays 
celebrating Brutus and Virginius, were commonplace in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries – in Britain as well as France.31 Their common denominator is not just the 
virtue of the hero, but the fact that the hero is always prepared to prove his virtue by 
sacrificing his private happiness (typically in the form of his children) for the public 
good. Thus, like “old Virginius” (p.13), who stabbed his daughter rather than allow 
her to be defiled by the lust of the patrician Appius, Simon the prompter threatens to 
stab his daughter for working the streets as a prostitute. Presumably with less 
naievety, Robespierre dons the mantle of Brutus. Paris (or Fabricius) reports how 
Robespierre “put on the expression of Brutus sacrificing his sons”: “He ranted about 
‘duty’, said where liberty was concerned he was ruthless, he’d sacrifice everything, 
himself, his brothers, his friends” (p.26). Fabricius’s account implies a weary 
recognition of the theatricality of Robespierre’s words: their scriptedness and their 
posedness. 
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 Büchner’s characters are either constantly in-role or constantly aware of role-
play by others. Danton’s remark, “we were botched when we were created, we lack 
something, some element. I cant name it, but we won’t find it by pulling each other’s 
guts out and scrabbling around in each other’s entrails” (p.34), doesn’t quite fit the 
approved tragedic register. Camille immediately rephrases this unrehearsed utterance 
in the correct key: 
Translated into the grand, tragic style that would go like this: how long must 
mankind eat its own limbs in eternal hunger? Or: how long must we men, 
marooned on a wreck, such each other’s blood in unquenchable thirst? Or: how 
long must we algebraists of the flesh, hunting for the ever elusive and unknown 
x write our equations in mangled limbs? (34) 
Remembered here are two revolutionary scenarios – a Prometheus play and David’s 
Raft of the Medusa – and something along the lines of a Saturn play or the Oresteia 
perhaps, which is to say a “classical” rehearsal of the horrors of the ancien régime.32  
 In this tragedic genre – incidentally the one favored by Robespierre – the mask 
conceals the hypocrite or the false revolutionary, just as in the Virginius play, a mask 
of Patrician dignity conceals the rapacity of Appius until it is finally torn from him by 
the terrorism of Virginius’s virtue. Hence Robespierre’s own faith in “unmasking” by 
Terror. Unmasking works however only if the masks are exclusively worn by the 
Revolution’s enemies. But if everyone is playing a part, then tearing off masks is 
pointless. “Do that”, says Danton, “and the faces will come off with them” (p.26). For 
Büchner’s Danton, the joke is as much for men as it is on them: 
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I can’t see why people don’t just stand still in the street and laugh in each 
other’s face. We should all laugh. From our windows, from our graves, ‘til 
heaven bursts open and the earth spins with laughter. (p.38) 
Camille has much the same thought, while awaiting execution in the Conciergerie: 
All that effort, pursing your lips, painting your face, putting on a good accent. 
We should take off our masks. Then we’ll see, like in a room of mirrors, only 
the infinitely repeated age-old image of the fool, the joker’s head. We are very 
like each other. All villains and angels, idiots and geniuses…all variations in 
different keys on the same tune. (p.75). 
In this image, we have returned full circle to the traditional theatrum mundi; which is 
to say to a version of Isabella’s “angry ape”. Yet Büchner cannot quite rest here. The 
whole point of the traditional theatrum mundi was its explanatory power. Somebody 
reliable – god or the heavenly chorus – was in control. This will never do for 
Büchner’s Danton: “we are puppets of invisible forces. We ourselves are nothing. We 
are the swords with which invisible spirits fight – and we can’t even see their hands” 
(p.44). 
For all Danton’s skepticism about the divine however, sin is undeniable. And if 
not precisely in a Christian form, then more in the form of what we have described as 
a haunting. When a nameless gentleman enthuses about a spectacular piece of staging: 
Did you see that new play? The hanging gardens of Babylon! A maze of vaults, 
stairways, corridors, flung up in the air with extraordinary ease. Outrageous 
audacity, it gives you vertigo. An amazing mind… (p.39); 
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the audacious scenography becomes a waking nightmare. A puddle in the street, 
“could have been deep”. How deep? “The earth has a thin crust. You could fall right 
through a hole in the middle of the street. One must tread carefully. But as for the 
play, I recommend it” (p.39). Even for the by-standers, the theatrical scenery of the 
revolutionary drama plasters over a void, or something resembling Lucac’s “grand 
hotel abyss”. This is roughly where Büchner deposits us: on the threshold of 
modernity, yet by courtesy of the hoariest of doctrines (original sin), the hoariest of 
commonplaces (the theatrum mundi), and Shakespeare’s single most concentrated 
effort to think it. 
 To return to our initial questions: Büchner’s attraction to Hamlet and Measure 
for Measure proceeds not just from his love of Shakespeare but from a deep intuitive 
“need” for the seemingly obsolete myth and doctrine of original sin. Hence does he 
privilege precisely those aspects and those moments in these plays in which the 
traditional theme finds its most powerful and elaborate expression. Büchner does not 
however follow Shakespeare into the remoter Patristic reaches of this complex in 
which the doctrine takes on its most affirmative form: man’s inability to see his own 
soul (his “glassy essence”) is ordained and thus not a cause for despair. The 
affirmative side of Christian doctrine is not germane to Büchner’s purposes because 
they have no optimistic tinge. Büchner’s motives are moreover historical rather than 
doctrinal, hence the deliberation of his focus on the trope of the theatrum mundi. Not 
only (so to speak) was this trope perfectly cast by history as an ironic foil to the overt 
theatricalization of the Revolution by Robespierre, but it was the same trope which 
had fascinated Büchner’s tragically deranged contemporary, the poet Lenz. To 
conclude: Büchner’s obsessive disinterring from Shakespeare’s text of the kindred 
themes of original sin and the theatrum mundi arises from authentic “existence 
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categories”. They carry no hint of ideological back-formations of the kind associated 
with the apostle of reaction, Joseph de Maistre. 
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